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Basic Dynamic Analysis

Basic Dynamic Analysis Report

This report is based on my hands-on analysis of a malware sample, following my previous static analysis.

In this phase, I wanted to see what the malware actually does when executed, rather than just looking at strings or API calls.


1. Objectives

For this dynamic analysis, I focused on:

  • Confirming the indicators I found during static analysis
  • Observing network communications made by the malware
  • Identifying any files it creates or deletes on the host
  • Understanding the sequence of process execution
  • Checking for any anti-analysis behavior

2. What I Found in Static Analysis

Before running the sample, I had already pulled some important indicators:

Strings

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cmd.exe /C ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & Del /f /q "%s"
http://ssl-6582datamanager.helpdeskbros.local/favicon.ico
C:\Users\Public\Documents\CR433101.dat.exe
Mozilla/5.0

APIs

  • URLDownloadToFileW
  • InternetOpenUrlW
  • InternetOpenW
  • CreateProcessW
  • ShellExecuteW

From this, I suspected that the malware would download a file, run it, and potentially delete itself under certain conditions.


3. Tools and Environment

I set up a controlled lab for analysis:

  • Wireshark to monitor network traffic
  • Procmon (Process Monitor) to watch file system and process activity

This setup allowed me to see exactly what the malware was doing without risking my main system.


4. Network Analysis

I noticed the URL in static analysis:

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http://ssl-6582datamanager.helpdeskbros.local/favicon.ico

I used Wireshark to check if the malware actually tried to access it. My filter was:

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http.request.full_uri contains favicon.ico

alt text

The malware made an HTTP GET request to the domain, and the User-Agent matched what I had in the strings (Mozilla/4.0).

alt text

Observation: This confirmed that the URL in the static analysis was actively used, not just embedded in the binary.


5. Host-Based Analysis

5.1 File System Behavior

I opened Procmon and filtered on the malware process:

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Process Name is Malware.Unknown.exe

alt text

I focused on file operations and saw:

alt text The malware created:

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C:\Users\Public\Documents\CR433101.dat.exe

This matched the path I had already seen during static analysis.


5.2 Command Execution & Self-Deletion

I also noticed a command string in static analysis:

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cmd.exe /C ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & Del /f /q "%s"

I watched Procmon for that command and saw:

alt text

Observation: The malware runs cmd.exe to ping 1.1.1.1, and if the ping fails, it deletes itself. I realized this is a simple anti-analysis mechanism: if the environment isn’t “normal” (like a sandbox), the malware self-deletes.


6. Execution Flow (Based on My Observations)

From running the sample, I mapped the execution logic:

If the URL is reachable:

  • Connects to the remote server
  • Downloads favicon.ico
  • Saves it as CR433101.dat.exe
  • Executes the downloaded file

If the URL is not reachable:

  • Performs a ping check to 1.1.1.1
  • Deletes the original binary
  • Stops execution

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network

  • http://ssl-6582datamanager.helpdeskbros.local/favicon.ico

Host

  • C:\Users\Public\Documents\CR433101.dat.exe
  • Command: cmd.exe /C ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & Del /f /q "%s"

8. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (Based on What I Observed)

TacticTechniqueIDEvidence
ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter (Windows Command Shell)T1059.003I saw cmd.exe executing ping and deletion commands
Defense EvasionIndicator Removal on HostT1070.004Malware deletes itself if ping fails
Defense EvasionSystem ChecksT1497Ping check used to determine environment
Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsT1071.001HTTP request to remote domain
Command and ControlIngress Tool TransferT1105Download of payload (favicon.ico)
ExecutionUser Execution (Indirect)T1204Execution of the downloaded payload
Execution / PersistenceCreate ProcessT1106Use of CreateProcessW API

9. Conclusion

By running the malware , I confirmed:

  • The network indicators from static analysis are real and active
  • The malware downloads a payload and writes it to disk
  • It uses a simple anti-analysis mechanism (self-deletion)
  • Observed behavior matches what I expected from the static indicators

This step helped me connect the dots between static clues and actual runtime behavior.


10. Next Steps (My Plan)

  • Start debugging the payload with x64dbg to trace its execution in detail
  • Analyze the dropped file CR433101.dat.exe
  • Expand my lab with INetSim and sandboxing to test more evasion techniques

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.